

CLERGY SECURITY

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CHAPTER 1

A REAL ISSUE

1. A survey of twenty-one stipendiary parochial clergy in an East London deanery in March/April 1997 has revealed that 80% of them had experienced their homes broken into and that 70% had been assaulted or threatened in the course of their ministry. Yet none of them was aware that their Diocese had ever done a formal review of the safety of their clergy home and only one (ordained in 1995) had ever received any formal training on security issues. 95% of them said that no-one was aware of where they were or who they were visiting during their day to day work.
2. In an increasingly violent society it is therefore clear, that issues of clergy safety need to be addressed if effective Christian ministry is to be offered in every parish in our land. The pattern of clergy working alone, often living and working in isolated buildings, and often being untrained or unresourced in safety issues, endangers not only themselves but also those who live and work with them.
3. The parochial clergy are normally visible and public figures - easily identifiable and found in their communities. They not only frequently work from home, church or hall, but are out and about in the streets, homes, hospitals, hostels and just about anywhere in their parish. Clergy also work very irregular hours - frequently evenings, and occasionally late into the night.
4. Situations and factors of particular significance are:
 - alcohol and drug abuse
 - involvement with domestic violence
 - the aggressive request/demand for money or assistance
 - the mentally ill
 - those living rough

CHAPTER 2

THE NATURE OF MINISTRY - AND BOUNDARIES

5. Ministry (i.e. service to God and to People) belongs to the whole people of God. However, within that total ministry are ministries of leadership. Some of these are exercised by ordained ministers (clergy).

What kind of person?

6. The Church of England's parish system means that every single person lives in a particular parish. Every parish has a clergy-person who has responsibility for pastoral care and mission. This responsibility is entrusted by the bishop through his licence. When the minister enters upon this work, she or he will be asked publicly "Will you care for the people of this parish in the name of Christ?" (or some similar question). This does not mean that the clergy can or should do it all. They become part of a local worshipping and witnessing Christian community and also because of their residence in a geographical community, they share the life of the wider community, both its joys and its sorrows, its securities and its risks.
7. The theology behind this includes -
 - a) God's gracious love to people. God cares - especially for those in particular need. This love is seen supremely in the incarnation - God was in Christ (2 Corinthians 5.19) living with us, ministering to us, suffering for us.
 - b) Ministry means service. Jesus Christ came not to be served but to serve and to give his life as a ransom for many (Mark 10.45).
 - c) The universality of ministry. It is to every person without exception - all nations, all races, the powerful and the powerless, the secure and the alienated, the professor or those with learning difficulties.
 - d) Hospitality - there are many references to God's expectation of hospitality in the Old Testament. Then, an early list of characteristics desirable in a Christian leader explicitly includes this - (2 Timothy 3.2).
 - e) Identity - 'Seek the welfare of the city in which I have placed you - on its welfare your welfare will depend'. (Jeremiah 29.7). Good clergy will identify with the local community, sharing its life and seeking its welfare.

In what kind of place?

9. The centuries-old tradition is that the parish has within it a vicarage - where the parson lives, and from which he/she conducts ministry. The vicarage has been the home of vicar and family and the traditional base for the work of ministry. For this reason an extra downstairs room for a study has been regarded as a necessity. The vicarage has normally been clearly identifiable and widely known. If it is not in the church grounds or immediately adjacent, the address will then be displayed on the church notice board. In most parishes, people wanting to apply for baptism, weddings or banns will call at the vicarage.
10. Some parishes have used the church vestry for this kind of parish and pastoral business. A "vestry hour" is advertised widely. The preparation groups for baptism and marriage have often moved to the vestry or to a lounge-type room in church or hall. In more recent years some parishes have developed a full-scale office (or even suite of offices) in the church or hall. It is worth giving serious consideration to this possibility, especially where the building is being used for other community activities.
11. The Inland Revenue (tax authority) recognises the vicarage as a 'work-place' when it allows fifty per cent of expenditure on heating and cleaning to be a legitimate expense of office.
12. Most clergy will want (or need) a boundary to be observed (most of the time) between the private-home part of their house and the public-work part. Vicarage design often attempts to make these distinct and separable.
13. It may be right, in certain circumstances, to have a parsonage house outside the parish boundaries though still as near as possible.

At what kind of time?

15. When the ordained person 'works from home' there will usually be need of not only boundaries of space but also boundaries of time.
16. The traditional parish ministry has sometimes been described as being available pastorally 'to all of the people all of the time'. This might have been a meaningful vision in an eighteenth century small village, but in a town or city and in the late twentieth century it can be seriously dangerous.
17. The following factors are relevant:
 - a) Clergy clearly need daily time for rest, relaxation, meals and housework etc.

- b) they need a weekly 'day off' (at the very least) and proper periods of holiday.
 - c) they need time for prayer, meditation, study, preparation and planning.
 - d) they need friends, and the opportunity to entertain and relax with family and friends.
 - e) Clergy will vary widely in terms of their domestic arrangements. Some will be alone, or have spouse, child(ren), parent(s), friend(s) or lodger(s) etc.
18. Sometimes (and in many situations frequently or even normally) there will be no one to answer the vicarage bell during many hours of the day or evening. Two principles seem clear:
- a) the pattern of Jesus' ministry (and other biblical material) does not exemplify nor require unbounded availability. Our Lord himself frequently sought solitude for quiet and prayer. He also gladly accepted invitations to parties and devoted special time to friends and colleagues.
 - b) the "when I'm at home I'm available" pattern is dangerous to personal health, marriage, family and friendships. There are too many stories of clergy saying that if they want some peace they have to 'go away' and 'get out of the vicarage'. This is an obvious recipe for stress-related illness.

Are substitutes allowed ?

19. Years ago a substitute was allowed in a game of football if a player was injured. Now the use of 'subs' is part and parcel of football's strategy. Here is another vital boundary question. In the absence of the 'professional' parson, what expectation is appropriate of the spouse, child, parent, friend or lodger?
20. There is a wide spectrum between on the one hand taking a message and, on the other hand, dealing with a caller who is asking for food or money and may be affected by alcohol, drugs or mental illness.
21. These matters need careful thought and attention, and so we turn to -

CHAPTER 3

TRAINING FOR SAFETY

22. Training in Health and Safety issues, and in the prevention and management of violence should be available to all clergy and accredited lay workers. Confidence and capability are important when in the situation of a potentially violent incident. General social skills will help put people at ease. This training should be with reference both to personal security and the security of colleagues and those sharing the vicarage home in whatever capacity.
23. Clergy training falls into two main divisions.
 - a) **pre-ordination** (often called initial ministerial) training.
24. These issues could be addressed in Pastoral Studies. The issues of relationships in various pastoral situations is clearly of fundamental importance. It does seem that some clergy have a remarkable naivety in these areas. The problem with the lecture or seminar room at this point is that the issues may seem very remote, artificial and theoretical. All Theological Colleges and Courses send students on placements. It would be helpful if security issues were discussed in this practical context. However, the situations of the placement supervisor and the student's later ministry might be hugely different.
 - b) **post-ordination** (better termed 'Continuing Ministerial Education').
25. Careful consideration of security issues could be integral to immediate post-ordination training, and for those appointed to their first incumbency, team-vicar or curate-in-charge post.
26. Additional areas for training are alcohol abuse and drugs issues, mental health, rough sleepers and the general dimension of "Community Safety" in the parish and district.
27. Clergy need to learn what help lines and support are available - particularly in the area of mental health. This should include information on statutory as well as voluntary provision. This should be part of induction to any new appointment or arrival to a new parish. Clergy need to know about and relate to community safety strategies. It is, of course, important for clergy and congregations to have a positive attitude to the mentally ill. The vast majority are not dangerous.
28. The great advantage of training at this point is its practical and situational rootedness, its immediate relevance to daily life and ministry. Self-help is vital. Clergy must be aware of their own situations and seek expert guidance and information as required. (See Appendix 2)

CHAPTER 4

WORKING AND LIVING IN SAFETY

29. The Church of England seeks to appoint clergy in every parish of this country. The theology of the Body of Christ requires that all parts be free to minister if the whole Body is to work effectively (1 Corinthians 12). However, it may be that some districts have already come to be seen as 'no-go' areas for certain types of clergy deemed to be more vulnerable e.g. those with young children or women living alone. Constructive action therefore needs to be taken both in looking to improve safety in parishes and in exploring new ways of ministering.
30. The Church Commissioners department which produces guide-lines for clergy-house construction (the so-called Green Guide) have contributed the following paragraphs on parsonage security.
31. Most clergy feel that it is part of their pastoral care to be accessible to the community but, at the same time, they and their families are entitled to live in a property which provides both reasonable safety and privacy. The purpose of these notes is therefore to offer practical advice to dioceses and the clergy on ways of achieving these objectives by adopting prudent measures to protect the parsonage and its occupants from unwanted intruders. This advice is based on the recommendations of the Metropolitan Police Crime Prevention Unit and the London Fire Brigade and will be reflected, as appropriate, in the revised Parsonage Design Guide ('The Green Guide') which offers guidelines to dioceses and others on the design and building of new parsonages. The revised Guide will be published in 1998.

The risks faced by clergy and their families

32. Clergy generally receive more visitors than the average householder. While the vast majority of visitors will have perfectly good reasons for calling at the house, a small minority may harbour criminal intent and will almost certainly turn up unannounced. Experience has shown however that most criminals are naturally wary and impatient people; burglars in particular are largely opportunists and the last thing they want is a struggle to enter a property. Their favourite target is a house where a door or window has been left temporarily unfastened often when the occupant has gone out for a short time and has forgotten to lock up. Statistics show that 62% of burglaries occur at the rear of the premises and 60% involve entry via windows.

33. Diocesan Parsonages Boards are responsible for housing the parochial clergy and the decisions they make regarding the level of security to be provided will, in practice, depend both on the character of a particular area and the precise location of the parsonage within it. Inner-city areas, for example, do not always present higher risks than those which may be encountered elsewhere, although the problems may differ in their nature and scale.
34. Undesirable visitors may target the vicarage if it is situated close to the church (which itself may be prone to burglary and vandalism) and the risks may be proportionately greater. For those clergy living further away from the church and with access to office facilities within the church or parish buildings for appointments/callers, the risks to the house and its occupants could conceivably be less. We do not, however, wish to substitute our judgement in these matters for those with detailed local knowledge and experience.

"Designing in" security

35. There is mounting evidence that the design of buildings themselves, and the way they are arranged, affect the way people behave. Where a new parsonage is to be built the opportunity should be taken to ensure that it is the design of the house itself that provides actual security and the perception of security. In such cases the aim should be literally to "design in" security and "design out" crime. "Bolting-on" extra precautions once the house has been built may not only look obtrusive and be expensive but could send out the wrong message to the community about the Church's ministry and the priest's approach to it. It could even deter or discourage legitimate visitors. Careful site planning is therefore essential at the outset and will also need to take account of such factors as the proximity or otherwise to the house of the church and/or parish buildings.
36. We strongly recommend that dioceses or their professional advisers consult their local Police Force Architectural Liaison Officer (ALO) once a site for a new parsonage has been identified. ALO's (also known as Crime Prevention Design Advisers (CPDA) in the Metropolitan Police Service) are attached to every local police force and London Borough and are responsible for identifying the security and personal safety concerns which apply to a particular site and first design. Pitfalls such as unwittingly designed climbing aids, access points or places of concealment can be easily eliminated and natural surveillance and sightlines can be maximised.
37. Our recommendation in this respect is made in support of the police initiative to extend the existing guidelines on the physical security of buildings against crime (BS8220 Part 1 1986 'Dwellings' and the standards adopted by the National House Building Council).

38. For many existing houses (including those parsonages that were not purpose-built), there are likely to be fewer opportunities to "design in" security in this way, but the advice of ALOs should nevertheless be sought at an early stage when major improvements are proposed or wherever there is a need to improve security generally. In some instances the provision of extra security devices may be the only realistic solution available but dioceses will need to decide each case on its merits. The Police are always willing to inspect a property and offer suggestions on burglary protection measures and they do not charge for this service.

(See Appendix 1 for further recommendations).

CHAPTER 5

MANAGEMENT OF SAFETY AT WORK

39. Whilst it is accepted that members of the clergy are not "employees" as such, the Church still has a duty of care.

Risk Assessment

40. The legislation relevant to violence at work can be considered as the "Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1992". Under this piece of legislation employers are required to carry out a RISK ASSESSMENT as follows:-

"(1) Every employer shall make a suitable and sufficient assessment of:-

- (a) the risks to the health and safety of his employees to which they are exposed whilst they are at work; and*
- (b) the risks to the health and safety of persons not in his employment arising out of or in connection with the conduct by him of his undertaking,*

for the purpose of identifying the measures he needs to take to comply with the requirements and prohibitions imposed upon him by or under the relevant statutory provisions."

41. The legislation also applies to self-employed people thus:-

"(2) Every employer shall make a suitable and sufficient assessment of:-

- (a) the risks to his own health and safety to which he is exposed whilst he is at work; and*
- (b) the risks to the health and safety of persons not in his employment arising out of or in connection with the conduct by him of his undertaking.*

for the purpose of identifying the measures he needs to take to comply with the requirements and prohibitions imposed upon him by or under the relevant statutory provisions."

42. The risk assessment should involve the identification of any hazards present and evaluating the risks involved. Planning and employee training can then be developed to take into account the risks identified enabling them to be controlled as and when they arise.

Procedures

43. The Ecclesiastical Insurance Group mainly encounter violence to staff in the insurance of nursing and rest homes. The booklet "Health and Safety in Residential Care Homes" published by the Health and Safety Executive has a chapter devoted to this subject. It is recommended that means be established to try to reduce aggressive behaviour towards employees rather than accepting violence as an unavoidable occupational hazard.
44. The following steps should be taken:-
 1. Find out if there is a problem.
 2. Record all incidents.
 3. Classify all incidents.
 4. Search for preventative measures.
 5. Decide what to do.
 6. Put measures into practice.
 7. Check that measures work.
45. Each member of the clergy should have a system for recording and reporting incidents of violence or aggressive behaviour.
46. Suggested preventative measures include:-
 - a) providing equipment such as panic buttons to alert others to the need for urgent assistance;
 - b) ensuring that staffing levels are appropriate to the task, and if there is a high risk whether the level is adequate;
 - c) rotating high risk jobs, i.e. so that the same person is not always at risk, or doubling up for a particularly unsafe task;
 - d) ensuring that experienced or less vulnerable members of the clergy are used for difficult tasks;
 - e) providing adequate, appropriate and proficient information for particular tasks on how to undertake them safely.

Monitoring

47. This is the key to effective health and safety work and will enable the Church to be proactive rather than reactive.

- Ministerial review.

The shape of ministerial review varies greatly from Diocese to Diocese but a straightforward question about security issues to be included in all reviews would keep a check on what is happening, and would enable training/support recommendations to be made in circumstances of particular concern.

- Clergy Chapter.

A member of each Clergy Chapter could take responsibility for keeping a check on security issues as a small but regular item on the Chapter agenda. This may include:

- i. co-ordinating information eg. circulating details of threatening callers at the Vicarage door who may be 'doing the rounds'
- ii making fellow clergy aware of training opportunities.

- Incident Report form.

The MSF booklet "Prevention of Violence at Work" has a useful definition of violence taken from the Health and Safety Executive:

Any incident in which an employee is abused, threatened or assaulted in circumstances arising out of the course of his or her employment.

Clergy should be encouraged to report such incidents, not only for their own sakes, but also with a view to protecting other clergy and their households from similar incidents happening again. A standard form could be produced by the Diocese which all clergy could keep 'on file'. If an incident occurs, such a form could then be sent to a member of the Bishop's staff, possibly an Archdeacon. This would ensure confidentiality but also the authority within the structures of the Church to take effective action. The Archdeacon could then supervise appropriate action to be taken either by him/herself or others. The Archdeacon could also report to the Bishop's staff meeting both to alert others at a senior level and to gain a Diocesan overview.

- Post Incident Pastoral Care.

After a violent incident is reported, pastoral care is clearly important. This may include support from a Bishop, Archdeacon, Area Dean, solicitor, police officer or counsellor as appropriate to the particular situation. In the immediate aftermath of an incident it is vital to avoid criticising the victim's actions or speculating on what may have provoked the attack. Discussions of any lessons learned for the future should be delayed until a later date.

Dioceses need to consider the issue of legal fees when a clergy person has suffered any kind of assault. Perhaps an insurance policy to cover these situations could be provided. It would be a grave additional concern if a clergy person who had suffered from a violent incident of any kind had then to face anxieties about financing legal advice and/or an injunction etc.

- Induction and/or Quinquennial Review.

The arrival of a new member of the clergy in the parish would seem an ideal time both to do a formal security review of Vicarage/tied accommodation (invariably the local Police Crime Prevention Officer is willing to help) and to alert the person to the specific circumstances of the local area including Church/Church Hall. This could also be done as a routine part of the Quinquennial Inspection. Reference to these aspects of good practice does not imply that such reviews are not already a regular feature in some (or even many) dioceses.

CONCLUSION

The paper is published for discussion following consideration by the Standing Committee of the House of Bishops. Especially commended are:

- Chapter 2 - for discussion in parish, deanery and diocese.
- Chapter 3 - for colleges, courses and CME officers.
- Chapter 4 - for diocesan parsonage committees.
- Chapter 5 - for bishops, archdeacons, rural (area) deans.

CHURCH COMMISSIONERS' GUIDELINES ON PARSONAGE SECURITY

RECOMMENDED SECURITY MEASURES

We believe that the following measures will help to deter all but the most determined intruder. Our recommendations relate primarily to new parsonage houses but, where relevant, may be applied to most types of clergy housing, new or existing. We recognise however that it might not be possible to apply them in all cases.

The recommendations are divided into three categories in order to distinguish the degrees of importance which we attach to our advice:

Category 1 describes the minimum precaution(s) necessary to provide adequate security;

Category 2 represents features of these precaution(s) that we feel are very desirable;

Category 3 contains detailed advice and suggestions which may not always be practicable to follow in all cases.

Additional recommendations are made where necessary in respect of parsonages located in inner-city and high risk areas generally.

Where relevant, the local Police Crime Prevention Officer (or ALO) should be asked to advise on the recommended British Standard/European Community Specifications and Codes of Practice. If required, the Police can also offer advice on suitable installers.

SITE AND GROUNDS

The approach to the property should be directly accessible and visible from the road with a clear view of the driveway from inside the house. No walls, fences, trees, shrubs etc should obscure sightlines. The route to the front entrance should be clearly defined and a strong, lockable gate should separate the front garden and driveway from the back door to the house.

Trees and shrubs should be sited with care and should not provide a would-be intruder with cover or a means of access to and from upstairs windows. Total screening is not advisable. When planting trees, consider species with slender

trunks and high foliage (eg. Beech, Pine) to help to maintain sightlines and to avoid masking any lighting columns in the drive.

The strategic siting of low to medium height prickly shrubs and bushes such as Barberry, Firethorn, Hawthorn and Holly ("hostile planting") can help to persuade callers to use the designated path and could also be used in vulnerable areas around the house. As a general rule it is unwise to plant shrubs etc so that they screen an outside door or window where they might hide someone tampering with a lock or window fastening.

A gravel or pea-shingle covered driveway offers excellent, inexpensive and low-maintenance security. The noise warns of approaching visitors and discourages unwanted ones.

Care should be taken to site any fuel bunkers or other storage area away from potential entry points above ground-floor level.

When considering the siting of fences, walls and gates, the safety of children playing in the garden should be taken into account.

Irrespective of proximity to the church plant, we feel that parsonages in inner-city areas should be well lit and closely overlooked by other residential buildings. Where appropriate the house might be designed in such a way that it does not appear to be radically different from neighbouring properties. This may help to reduce the chances of it being specifically targeted by a thief.

Generally speaking, the privacy of the occupants of and visitors to parsonages in high-risk locations should be secondary to the need for security.

EXTERIOR LIGHTING

A good level of exterior lighting, both front and back, is generally considered to be a deterrent to vandals and burglars who will be made to feel more conspicuous than they would be in a poorly lit area.

The lights should be adjacent to all outside doors and operated by a timeswitch, photo-electric cell or passive infra-red detectors and fitted with a manual override facility. Installation should conform to the recommended standards.

The lights should be positioned so as to illuminate callers' faces and not just the tops of their heads. Consider lights for the drive, especially in areas of little or no street lighting.

In some areas of the inner-city and other highly vulnerable locations we recommend permanent dusk to dawn external lighting covering all sides of the

property. Modern compact fluorescent lamps provide all-night lighting at relatively low cost.

INTRUDER ALARM SYSTEM

Alarm systems are now considered to be an essential adjunct to security for homes of all types and locations and not just those in high risk areas. Not only do they serve as a deterrent but in the event of burglary they alert neighbours and generate an element of fear and uncertainty in the criminal, so causing him or her to spend less time in or on the perimeter of the premises and thereby limiting or avoiding loss to the householder.

A Personal Attack (or Panic Alert) Button should be fitted with the alarm system. This is important for those clergy living alone and others who may be particularly concerned about the risk of personal assault. Providing this facility can greatly help to reduce such fears.

The alarm system must be audible (there is little point in having one if nobody can hear it) and it should be linked to a monitoring station as should the Personal Attack Button. Installation and wiring should conform to the recommended BS Standards and Codes of Practice.

Burglar alarms do not prevent break-ins, they merely give an audible warning that someone is attempting to gain entry or is moving about in the house. The recommended system usually takes the form of small sensors fixed to windows and doors which are connected to a control panel and will react to any tampering by a would-be intruder before entry is actually made. We do not recommend alternative systems which involve only the use of infra-red devices or pressure sensitive pads to detect movement indoors since no warning will be given until an intruder is already inside the building. The installation of the alarm system during the construction of a new house will ensure that the problem of damage to decorations is minimised.

It may be necessary to fit a protective grille over the alarm system in areas where vandalism is a particular problem.

FRONT DOOR

We recommend two doors at the front of the house for added security.

The outer door should be fitted with laminated glass (with any windows to the side also fitted with laminated glass) to allow a clear view of callers. The inner door should be of robust timber design with a minimum 44mm thickness. Doors of other materials must comply with the recommended BS and NHBC Standards.

We recommend the following security features:

- Door frame security fixed at 600mm centres.
- A rebated stop, either shaped or glued and pinned to withstand a determined charge or kick.
- Rim latch $\frac{1}{3}$ from the top with separate mortice deadlock to the recommended BS Standard, $\frac{1}{3}$ from the bottom (avoiding any rail joints). The lock should have at least 1,000 key variations. Multi-point locking with three or more dead bolts may be an alternative
- Entry by key only.
- Pair of non-key operated bolts to inside face, top bolt no higher than 1,500mm.
- Three hinges supplemented by hinge bolts on outward opening doors.
- Door chain or limiter.
- Inner door viewer at maximum height of 1,500mm (it is sensible to choose the device with the widest viewing angle, possibly 200 degrees).
- Letterbox to be a minimum 400mm from the door locks.

Glass panelled external doors are not so insecure as might be assumed, particularly when fitted with laminated glass. Burglars are normally very reluctant to break a large panel of glass to gain entry by stepping through the resulting jagged hole. They may also need to vacate the property in a hurry by the same route and serious injury can often be caused by broken glass (although much less likely with laminated glass). Provided the glazed door is well made, a good fit in its frame and fitted with the recommended locks and bolts, it will be as secure as a solid door.

In areas where crime levels are exceptionally high, we recommend all wooden doors at the front of the house with the outer door strengthened by steel plates (unless natural light is required, in which case any glazing should be kept to a minimum and laminated). It may also be necessary to provide a fixed point video entry-phone at the front entrance to the house (providing audio-visual communication) with the camera carefully positioned so as to prevent tampering, to eliminate blind spots and to highlight visitors' faces or, in the very worst crime areas, close-circuit television incorporating a wide angled lens and a permanent recording facility. Consideration should also be given to providing a fireproof letterbox.

BACK OR KITCHEN DOOR

The back door should be of substantial construction with secure fixings to deter intruders.

It should not be directly approachable from the road in view of the security risk and potential loss of privacy. A mortice sashlock (conforming to the recommended BS Standard) and 100mm key operated bolts should be fitted top and bottom. The top bolt should not be fitted above a height of 1,500mm.

FRENCH WINDOWS

These should have the same physical and fitting requirements as for doors.

To include:

- Mortice rebate sash lock.
- One pair of key operated mortice security bolts or key operated surface mounted bolts to each door, or espagnolette locking for both doors.
- Two hinge bolts on any outward opening door.

SLIDING PATIO DOORS

Where provided they should be fitted with laminated glass.

To include:

- Anti-lift device.
- Minimum three-point locking or equivalent security device.

WINDOWS

The windows in any property are a potential entry point for intruders and must be made secure.

- Window frames must be securely fixed.
- External glazing beads should be glued or bonded and pinned.

- Key operated locks conforming to BS Standards should be fitted to all opening ground-floor windows but not fitted to upstairs windows unless access can be gained via a balcony, flat roof or drainpipe. If locks are fitted it is essential that keys are readily accessible in the event of a fire.
- Locks fitted independently of window furniture should be "push/turn to lock-key to unlock" or which lock automatically when the window is closed. All ground floor windows and those at higher levels which are fitted with locks should always be locked when the house is left empty, even if it is for only a few minutes.
- All windows fitted with locks should be capable of being locked when left part-open for ventilation purposes.

Where there is a history of persistent vandalism (window breaking probably being the most common damage inflicted), we recommend that consideration be given to fitting laminated glass to all ground-floor windows provided that the keys to window locks can be located quickly in an emergency. There may be a need for the occupants to leave the house swiftly when a fire is discovered and it is also for this reason that we do not recommend gaoler's gates in front of doors and steel bars/shutters on windows.

Consideration should be given in existing houses to the need for an additional window in the study and/or the use of a net curtain or blind for discreet surveillance purposes if there is no clear sightline from the study to the main approach to the house.

GARAGES AND OUTBUILDINGS

It is important not to overlook the security of the garage and any garden sheds etc. Apart from the value of tools in themselves, many are particularly suitable for house breaking. Spades, for example, can be used to try to break open doors and ladders should always be stored securely for obvious reasons. If they are too long to fit in a garage or shed they are best padlocked to brackets on a convenient wall of the house. Shed doors need to be stoutly made and well fitting with hinges which cannot be tampered with from the outside. There is little point in fitting an expensive heavy duty padlock and hasp if the door can be forced by levering off or unscrewing flimsy hinges.

In inner-city areas or where the personal safety of the clergy is of particular concern, a remote control garage door operated from inside the car is recommended and a secure side door connecting the garage to the house should be provided. Any parking space should always be well-lit.

OTHER DAY-TO-DAY SECURITY MEASURES

There are a number of simple precautions that clergy can take in order to protect the security of their homes. For example:

Avoid tell-tale signs on going away

- When the house is to be left empty for more than a day, always tell a reliable neighbour or friend, but only tell those who need to know.
- Cancel all deliveries, milk, newspapers and ask someone to check that the post and free newspapers are not sticking out of the letterbox. Alternatively, ask the post sorting office to hold mail.
- Ask a neighbour or friend to water the garden and indoor plants, mow the lawn and cut the hedge. They might also be asked to park their car occasionally on the drive or in front of the house and put the bin out on bin day.
- Keep garage doors shut and locked. If the garage has windows, use curtains or blinds to block prying eyes. No car often means that nobody is home.
- If everyone in the household is to be out until after dark, leave a light on in a room, not the hall. A time switch or light-sensitive fitting is recommended.
- Remember that curtains and blinds drawn in the daytime attract a thief.
- Make sure the doorbell is only audible from the inside - let people assume it is not working rather than not being answered.
- Disconnect telephones that can be heard left ringing (particularly those on window sills). Also, any answerphone messages should always say "We cannot come to the 'phone at present", rather than "We are not here".

STAYING SAFE

- Where possible, check the credentials of unfamiliar callers. Ask for some identification if they claim to be officials - do not be fooled by a uniform. Some organisations use a password to help identify their representatives.
- Ask the local police about security-marking valuables. The police can provide stickers for windows advertising that this has been done.

- Never hide a spare key outside.
- If the house is to be left empty, shout "goodbye" to an imaginary person left inside and leave a radio on while the house is empty.
- If someone is seen acting suspiciously, a simple "Can I help you?" should do the trick. Potential thieves do not like being noticed.
- If in a Neighbourhood Watch area, display a sticker in the front and back windows of the house.

GUIDELINES ON RESPONSE TO CASUAL CALLERS AT THE DOOR

The following guidelines are offered as a basis for discussion.

They may appear at first to be stark and uncompromising, but this is a reflection of the society in which we live and the uncertainties surrounding this issue.

- › Decide locally what level of need exists and what help will be offered. (Some with years of experience say that the type of caller has changed so much that clergy should not attempt to get involved, except on the level of giving information, or making referrals.)

1. If you decide that help will consist of information only:

- ✓ Try to ensure that callers never leave feeling rejected or unloved. Even when you do not give the help requested, something positive can be offered.
- ✓ Have consistent rules and let the caller know clearly and quickly where they stand. Tell them what is on offer.
- ✓ Do give information. Have a printed list of resource centres (local shelters, social services, psychiatric social worker, emergency social worker, Citizen's Advice Bureaux, Alcoholics Anonymous, CRUSE, Relate).
- ✓ Work with other local churches to provide care cover.
- X Do not undertake a pastoral engagement.
- X Do not invite the caller inside.

2. If you decide to offer more than information:

- ✓ Ensure that the ground rules are consistently applied.
- ✓ Say if you feel a demand or expectation is unreasonable.
- ✓ Do hold on to the 'stories' that people tell.
- ✓ Make arrangements with a local cafe to provide food and tea on production of a voucher. Have a limit of about £4.
- ✓ Keep food from harvest services to hand out.

- ✓ A stock of canned drinks can save having to make tea at an inconvenient time.
- ✓ Set times and boundaries when help is available and do not make knee-jerk responses 'on-demand'.
- ✓ Help callers with a long story to get to the point. Ask them, "What do you want me to do?"
- ✓ If appropriate, refer people to specialised caring agencies.
- ✓ Remember that the traditional response of a cup of tea and a sandwich can meet both a spiritual and practical need, and demonstrates God's care for the caller.
- X Do not look for thanks.

3. Money

- › It generally helps to have a local 'no money' policy. But parishes may wish to exercise discretion in particular cases.
- › Demands for money often come when social services are closed. In fact they are never closed. The number of the duty social worker can be obtained from local police.
- › Demands for train tickets have been met by people going to buy the ticket, but callers can present the ticket for a cash refund.
- › Demanding money with menaces is a criminal offence.

These Guidelines are taken from *Knocking at heaven's door* (see Bibliography Page 29) and used by permission of the Diocese of London.

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